'Learning to code' has transformed from a grassroots movement into a major policy agenda in education policy in England. This chapter provides a 'policy network analysis' tracing the governmental, business and civil society actors now operating in 'policy networks' to mobilize learning to code in the reformed National Curriculum. Learning to code provides evidence of how power over the education policy process is being displaced to cross-sector actors such as 'policy labs' that can broker networks across public and private sector borderlines. It also examines how the pedagogies of learning to code are intended to inculcate young people into the material practices and ways of seeing, thinking and doing associated with the professional culture of programmers, the emerging context of solutions-engineering in social and public policy, and with the participatory culture of social media 'prosumption.'
Interest in the educational value of learning to write and programme computer code has grown from a minority concern among computing educators, grassroots computing organizations, and computer scientists into a major policy discourse.
Originating with activist and grassroots campaigning groups such as Computing at School, 'learning to code' is now being actively promoted in England by cross-sector organizations including Nesta (National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts) and the Nominet Trust that are increasingly seeking to participate in educational governance, as detailed later. As a result, learning to code has been recognized as desirable amongst politicians and educational policymakers, as evidenced by the scheduled 2014 replacement in the English National Curriculum of ICT (Information and Communication Technology)which emphasizes office skills, with a new computing programme of study which emphasizes computer science and programming skills (Department for Education 2012). Learning to code has been transformed from a grassroots campaign into a major policy agenda in a remarkably concentrated period, yet the powerful actors mobilizing it into curriculum policy are largely unrecognized in educational policy research, and the material practices of 
Policy network analysis
The chapter draws on a study of the participation in education of cross-sector organizations, think tanks, and other 'policy intermediaries' and 'policy labs.' The focus is specifically on the organizations Nesta and the Nominet Trust, and on the ways that they have established networks of governmental, civil society and commercial actors to promote and campaign for learning to code. Nesta was established as the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts by the UK New Labour government in 1998 but became independent in 2011 with a remit to innovate in public services; 'digital education' is one of its key themes and the platform on which it advocates a range of learning to code initiatives. Nesta's activities around learning to code are all managed within its 'Public Innovation Lab' which seeks to solve social challenges through the application of new technologies.
The Nominet Trust was established in 2008 by Nominet, the internet registry which maintains the .uk register of domain names. The Nominet Trust invests in projects and programmes 'using the internet to address big social challenges,' and describes itself through the discourse of social investment, social innovation, and social technology entrepreneurship. The Nominet Trust hosts the 'Social Tech Guide' website which showcases technology projects which 'address complex social challenges, from health and education to poverty and climate change.' It positions technology as a 'social good' and its steering committee consists of both the chief executive of the Nominet Trust and the chief executive of Nesta. In collaboration, Nesta and Nominet Trust are major partners in the campaign Make Things Do Stuff which promotes a wide range of activities and organizations associated with learning to code and other forms of 'digital making. ' Organizationally, these organizations are neither governmental nor commercial actors, but straddle sectors and broker projects and connections between them. Nesta and the Nominet Trust both act as 'hubs' for a variety of partnerships and networks.
They are prototypical of 'public and social innovation labs' ('psilabs') or 'i-teams' (innovation teams) as Nesta documents describe them (Mulgan 2014; Nesta 2014 ).
Public and social policy innovation labs seek to put 'smart software' and digital data to work deep within the activities of government, alongside new forms of 'sociable governance' through relationships and collaborations, particularly in the redesign of public services, education, health, and social services (Williamson 2014b ). Nesta's own public innovation lab and the Nominet Trust's emphasis on social innovation and 'social tech' are evidence of how such organizational reconfigurations are enabling them to position themselves as solution-providers for public and social policy problems. Policy labs, or psilabs and i-teams, are a new organizational format combining a variety of 'sociable' methods of co-design, rapid prototyping, design ethnography, and citizen entrepreneurship with 'smart' coded methods, such as data mining, data analytics, and predictive 'machine learning' methods in the redesign of services such as education. In this emerging sector, code and algorithms are seen as engineering solutions to the problems of re-engineering government, as 'hack events' sponsored by Nesta, such as government hacking and 'hackathons' for public sector redesign, clearly demonstrate (Merrett 2014) .
These organizations are contributing to new forms of cross-sectoral 'network governance' and 'policy networks' in public education in England (Williamson 2014c) . 'Networked governance' is characterized by decentralization, mobility, fluidity, looseness, complexity and instability, by the criss-crossing of sectoral borderlines and the hybridization of ideas, discourses and materials from bureaucratic, academic and media fields. Educational 'policy networks' are a specific interorganizational materialization of network governance. Made up primarily of 'experts' from think tanks, policy institutes, multilateral agencies, media consultancies, political lobbying and public relations, policy networks 'perform the role of conveying ideas between different areas of the production, distribution, or circulation of ideas' in order to 'influence the decision-making process' (Lawn & Grek 2012: 75) . While the concepts of network governance and policy networks are not uncontentious, Ball and Junemann (2012) claim that in England education policy certainly is now being dispersed and enacted by increasingly heterogeneous and sometimes unstable networks of governmental, civil society and business actors.
In seeking to demonstrate how education is increasingly being governed through network governance, and through associated organizational configurations of 'policy labs' and 'social innovators,' this chapter is focused on how intermediary policy actors are promoting the practices of learning to code in schools. Learning to code is both a set of pedagogic practices and a contemporary policy discourse being enacted by a mixture of actors from policy labs, governmental agencies, and commercial companies, through a variety of projects, partnerships and campaigns. Through such networks, learning to code is being constructed as a hybrid product of different discourses, interests and agendas. Adopting methods of 'policy network analysis,' I focus on the reports, pamphlets, websites and other documents which articulate these intermediaries' ideas and aspirations. As Ball & Junemann (2012: 14) articulate it, the method of policy network analysis seeks to identify actors, their associations and relationships, and their power and capacities to contribute to policy decisionmaking. The specific focus below is on identifying key organizations from government, business and civil society involved in promoting various activities around 'learning to code' (primarily in England), and on analyzing the ways in which they discursively construct and mobilize learning to code.
The central argument is that intermediary organizations such as Nesta and the Nominet Trust are promoting computer programming activities in ways which embed young people firmly in the coded infrastructures and material practices of today's digitally-mediated landscape. This demands a consideration of how power is being displaced both to intermediary actors and to the coded infrastructures and programming practices they promote. In the next section, I seek to understand 'code' as an increasingly pervasive source of power in the world, before proceeding to examine the formation of the 'learning to code' agenda.
Programming power
Computer code is commonly understood as the machine-readable language programmed to instruct computer software. It is the substrate to software, and is constructed through programming-the art and science of putting together algorithms and instructions that can be automatically read and translated by a machine in order to do something. A growing recognition of the power of code is reflected in popular science publications like 9 Algorithms that Changed the Future (MacCormick 2013) which demonstrate the vast reach of code and its algorithmic ordering structures into contemporary everyday practices. The algorithms of the title refer to search engine indexing and ranking; the cryptographic algorithms required by secure websites; pattern recognition algorithms for recognising handwriting, speech and faces; data compression of files like MP3s and JPEGs; and the transactional changes made to databases, such as those required for online banking and social networking sites like Facebook. All of these algorithms and their rules and sequences are written in code, making code itself into a significant contemporary material device, the coders that script it into significant actors, and the coding they do into a significant material practice.
Beyond its technical and material existence, code also exerts important social effects.
Computer code is thoroughly entangled in contemporary practices of surveillance, enterprise, consumption, leisure, economics, politics, and much else, as developments such as government snooping, 'smart cities,' personalized targeted advertising, and the transformation of online popular culture attest (Mackenzie 2006; Beer 2013 ). As code is wired out into the world in software products, it is now understood among many social scientists as more than just the written script that instructs and controls computing devices. As Manovich (2013: 15) phrases it, software is 'a layer that permeates all areas of contemporary societies' (original italics).
Through the software it instructs, code organizes, disrupts and participates in contemporary social, economic, political and cultural activities and practices. It may even be 'reassembling social science' itself (Ruppert, Law & Savage 2013) as new digital methods and search algorithms make possible new analyses, configurations and visualizations of the world. Sociotechnically understood as both a product of the world and a relational producer of the world, code acts: it interpolates, mixes with and ultimately produces collective political, economic and cultural life (Kitchin & Dodge 2011) . It is inseparable from its social, cultural, political and economic processes of production and its socially, culturally, politically and economically productive effects.
Moreover, people view and understand code through the deployment of powerful and consistent discourses that promote, justify and naturalize software across a whole array of domains (Kitchin & Dodge 2011) . Indeed, for Mackenzie and Vurdubakis (2011: 16) , software is the 'hybrid progeny of computer code and social codes of conduct': not just the technical fact of lines of code that instruct software, but sets of social codes with the power to 'direct how citizens act' (Thrift 2005: 173) .
All of these things add up to a pervasive system of thought within which the procedures and processes written in code and sequenced in algorithms may be taken as a new set of rules and mundane routines to live by. The power of code is not just in its technical operations but in how it sinks into everyday cultural, economic and political discourse, thought and action.
We need to consider here the idea that code acts as a 'vital source of social power' that augments society (Kitchin & Dodge 2011: 246) . As the substrate to software, code is significant as a source of power because it can 'make things happen' by virtue of its 'execute-ability,' its ability to perform tasks according to encoded instructions (Mackenzie & Vurdubakis 2011: 6) . Software code is not inert but fundamentally performative. The performativity of code to make things happen and to produce outcomes autonomously lies at the heart of many recent accounts of the role of software in modern life, to the extent that some researchers consider software code and algorithms as a challenge to human agency itself. As Beer (2009: 987) claims, 'algorithmic power' may be 'becoming a part of how we live, a part of our being, a part of how we do things, the way we are treated, the things we encounter, our way of life.' Scott Lash (2007) has described the power of software code in a technologically mediated world as 'power after hegemony.' His article is an ambitious reconsideration of cultural theory; here I want to pick up on the major point he raises about power and algorithms. Lash (2007: 55-56) argues that in cultural studies 'hegemony means domination through consent as much as coercion,' through ideology and discourse, and 'that cultural power is largely addressed to the reproduction of economy, society and polity.' For Lash, our new era, however, is thoroughly technologically mediated and consequently things like computer code and its algorithms are introducing their 'rules' into human societies. In contrast to the reproductive logic of hegemony, in a new epoch 'post-hegemonic power operates through a logic of invention, hence not of reproduction but of chronic production of economic, social and political relations' (Lash 2007: 56) . These rules are 'generative' and 'inventive', and as algorithms increasingly pervade the social fabric as new kinds of social rules, they therefore have the generative and inventive capacity to shape and configure social formations and individual lives. This is because code, by its very nature, changes things: it transforms an input into an output; and because algorithms function by ordering, structuring and sequencing things (Mackenzie 2006 ). As such, how code and algorithms are programmed can extend into the ordering, structuring and sequencing of the social world itself. In this sense, we are moving into a 'society in which power is increasingly in the algorithm' (Lash 2007: 71) ; where power is in the software we use and where, as Beer (2009: 995) adds, 'information is harvested about us' in order to generate new experiences. Thus, we move in a world where software 'learns' about us: This is undoubtedly an expression of power, not of someone having power over someone else, but of the software making choices and connections in complex and unpredictable ways in order to shape the everyday experiences of the user. (Beer 2009: 997) Whereas hegemonic power sought to secure consent through ideology and discourse to the reproduction of economy, society and polity, a post-hegemonic form of algorithmic power generates new configurations of social, economic and political practice. Algorithmic power constantly generates new realities. This is the case, for example, when Amazon's algorithms generate recommendations for consumer purchases; when Google's PageRank algorithm orders search query results; or when Facebook's NewsFeed algorithm configures users' social network feeds; but even more significantly when algorithmic data analytics systems automate such things as the provision of government services, organize transport and utilities infrastructures, coordinate social control mechanisms, and enable real-time governmental and commercial surveillance. In all these cases, the generative rules of algorithms work from inside everyday life rather than from outside in the form of a dominant ideology or discourse. They constitute 'grammars of action' for new forms of social ordering and governance, and are endowed with the power to 'actively reshape behaviour' (Kitchin & Dodge 2011: 109) . As Beer (2013: 70) explains, 'algorithms create realities, they constitute the world in different ways and they present us with limitations and boundaries that we then live by.' As such, Mager (2012) has argued that the kind of code and algorithms that facilitate everyday social practices such as using search engines are based on particular social models of the world. In order for an algorithmic system to function, Neyland (2014) claims, the world outside of the system has to be mathematically modelled in such a way that it can be built-in to the social world of the algorithmic system. Google's driverless car, for example, relies on ultra-precise digitized maps to navigate the physical world-a compelling case of the ways in algorithms and their code are involved in building 'a world out there into a world in here, in the algorithmic machine' (Neyland 2014: 11) .
Ideological hegemonic power from outside is being elided by post-hegemonic power that, through the ubiquity of devices programmed in code and algorithms, acts as a 'technological unconscious' patterning everyday activity (Thrift 2005) .
Software code and algorithms are, then, through and through social products as well as producers of the world. They model the world in particular ways, and provide grammars of action which make it possible then to act on that world. In the next sections I explore how this understanding of code might enable us to better understand emerging developments around programming and learning to code in schools. Learning to code inculcates young people in the material practices of code production, whilst also embedding them firmly in a heavily software-mediated environment structured and ordered by code and algorithmic power.
Programming pedagogies
Today there is a growing interest in promoting computer programming to young people. In this section I explore the ways in which 'learning to code' has been discursively constructed and promoted by cross-sector intermediary organizations, including Nesta and the Nominet Trust, which act as conduits for a network of interests from the governmental, commercial and civil society sectors. As we shall see, the result is that 'learning to code' has become a contingent, hybrid and elastic concept. As the Observer newspaper columnist Naughton (2012) has stated, the growth of interest in programming comes with a variety of different assumptions from advocates across different sectors. The dominant policy interest, he argues, is in promoting and growing computer entrepreneurship for the economic competitiveness of 'UK plc.' The alternative perspective, which Naughton advocates, is learning to code for informed citizenship in a world where computation has become ubiquitous. Naughton draws specifically on a catchy slogan from Douglas Rushkoff (2010), who states that 'if you are not a programmer, you are one of the programmed,' and argues that learning to code is essential if we wish to understand how our technologies work and how they work on us. These arguments certainly appear to acknowledge that the world is increasingly governed by coded products, and suggest that 'learning to code' is a way of giving learners some agency to counteract its pervasive power.
The evidence that such arguments for learning to programme computer code has been taken up in educational discourse is in the fast growth of 'Code Club', a volunteer-based grassroots initiative that places computer programmers in afterschool clubs in primary schools to teach young children basic programming and coding. According to the organizers of Code Club:
Learning to code is an important skill now we're living in a digital age. It's not just enough for children to know how to use technology. They should know how it works too. … They should understand that they're in charge of the computer, and can (and should) As a partner in Make Things Do Stuff, the Nominet Trust, too, has produced a series of reports, events, projects and blogs dedicated to the topic of learning to code.
Echoing political discourse on the subject, the Nominet Trust chief executive Annika Small claims there is a 'serious and economic imperative' besides the 'fun and learning that digital making offers young people,' namely that the 'UK and global jobs market are crying out for digital skills and we need to make sure that the next 
Programmers and prosumers
Despite its rapid growth, the underlying assumptions about learning to code have gone largely unquestioned. Clearly coding carries into the classroom a specific set of assumptions about knowledge and forms of knowing and doing. As noted earlier, programming is not just a technical procedure but is related to systems of thought about the way the world works, and about how it might be modelled in order to further shape people's interactions with it. Indeed, for Kitchin & Dodge (2011: 26 ) the material practice of programming is 'an expression of how the world can be captured, represented, processed and modelled computationally with the outcome subsequently doing work in the world.' For example, the ways in which the world of banking can be captured in online banking systems, or how biometric systems are constructed to facilitate automated border control, subsequently shape how these activities take place. In other words, programming code captures ideas about how the world works, in order to then augment, mediate and regulate people's lives.
Though, as Kirschenbaum (2009) has pointed out, any act of programming may contain biased, distorted, caricatured, or merely partial selections from the world it claims to model; in that sense, programming is a persuasive or perhaps rhetorical act. The material practice of programming, therefore, possesses the power to shape how people know and act in the social world.
Moreover, material practices of learning to code assume a certain image of the desirable individual learner to be produced. As the researcher of code cultures Mackenzie (2006) argues, the work of computer programmers is premised on notions of flexibility, speed, virtuality, just-in-time-production, teamwork, and other aspects of 'immaterial labour.' Make Things Do Stuff, Code Club, Year of Code and the like anticipate learners' entry into a network-based digital economy for which the work of programmers stands as a prototypical practice. Thus an emphasis on learning to code is part of what Barry (2001) describes as the contemporary political preoccupation with sculpting a mind and body with the technical skills, knowledge and capacity to meet the demands of new flexible work routines. Consistent with much recent education policy discourse, learning to code activities 'govern by activating the capacities of the individual' to contribute to the digital economy (Ozga, Segerholm & Simola 2011: 88) . In this sense, learning to code may be interpreted as a material practice of 'algorithmic ideology' (Mager 2012) , a kind of inculcation into the codes of conduct, practices, assumptions, and knowledges that underpin production in the digital economy. Thus, learning to code embodies a host of assumptions and working practices based on ideas such as computational thinking, statistical modelling, systems thinking, scientific rationality, and algorithmic logic that have their origins in the working practices of the computing professions. These are very particular kinds of social practices imbued with 'particular values and contextualized within a particular scientific approach,' and often reductionist, functionalist and technicist modes of thinking that see the world in computational terms rather than in relation to cultural, economic or political context (Kitchin 2014: 5) . To adapt Lash's (2007: 75) terms, what are being rehearsed through learning to code are the 'hands-on' practices and epistemologies of 'coders, writing algorithms,' working in 'ephemeral project-networks' in 'laboratories and studios.' In a culture where power is in the algorithm, Lash argues, status goes to those actors with the material skills, social values, and expert epistemologies to construct those algorithms. At its most basic, such practices amount to the fantasy of technical 'solutionism' where the right code and algorithms may be seen as the solution to complex problems. Learning to code thus seeks to inculcate learners into the systems of thought associated with programmers, and with the knowledge and philosophies of the world, with all their biases, prejudices, ideological assumptions and modes of perception, that are materialized in software products.
It is clear that for its advocates at Nominet Trust and Nesta, as well as both the governmental and business actors with which they are networked, that coding is positioned as a rewarding, desirable and skilled occupation, not least in terms of providing technical engineering solutions to public and social policy problems. Both Nesta and Nominet Trust support 'hack' events such as 'government hacking' and 'hackathons' which put teams of computer programmers together, using codesharing tools, to engineer solutions to intractable government and public sector problems (Merrett 2014) . The Nominet Trust's 'Social Tech Guide' provides ample evidence of how technology entrepreneurship, twinned with practices of coding and hacking, has been positioned for 'social good' (Nominet Trust 2014) . According to Morozov (2013) Yet the depiction of solutionist hacking glosses over the fragility, complexity and mundanity of much coding work in the digital economy. As Mackenzie (2006: 14) notes, software has to be coded, and yet this job may be undertaken by 'a programmer, webmaster, corporation, software engineer, team, hacker or scripter….
The figure of the programmer often vacillates between potent creator of new worlds and antisocial, perhaps criminal or parasitic.' More prosaically, the work and material practice of coding is often dull, routinized and monotonous, as well as difficult, frustrating and dysfunctional (Kitchin & Dodge 2011) . Moreover, as Kitchin and Dodge (2011: 33) is being solicited into a system of thought, ways of seeing, knowing and doing associated with a culture of coding practice that is not always as systematic, objective and expert as it is widely represented as being by learning to code advocates. The material practice of coding is more complex, contingent, confused, ignorant, and distanced from concerns over its effects on the social world, and rests on the assumption that the problems with that social world can be addressed with algorithmic solutions written in code. This is about applying technical engineering to the task of human and social engineering. Learning to code is premised on a fantasy of the material practices associated with coding which simplifies and romanticizes the empirical reality of disciplinary practice in the digital economy. 'Prosumption' registers the alleged blurring of production and consumption as consumers of digital media increasingly also become its producers. Manovich (2013: 18-19) , for example, argues that 'software development is gradually getting more democratized' as a result of the recent simplification of programming environments through social media. The argument that software production, coding, and other forms of prosumption are ultimately democratizing and empowering has been taken up enthusiastically by Code Club in particular, and also repeated by both the Nominet Trust and Nesta, albeit as part of a messy mix of commercial, economic and civil society discourses and arguments.
From a more critical perspective, Beer & Burrows (2013) question the apparent 'democratization' of software, claiming that this logic plays back into the hands of commercial digital media organizations. They argue that network-based social media-Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Wikipedia, and so on-have facilitated the increasing participation of people in the formation of media content, leading to the: significant phenomena of the growing amount of 'labouring' people are undertaking as they 'play' with these new technologies: creating profiles, making status updates; distributing information; sharing files; uploading images; blogging, tweeting; and the rest. (Beer & Burrows 2013: 49) Ideas associated with participation in the networked cultures of social media, such as co-production, prosumption, crowdsourcing, user-centred design, and so on, have long been attractive with organizations such as Nesta, which has put such practices at the centre of its reformatory ambitions for 'digital education' as well as more widely in its proposals for 'people-powered' public services and new 'conversational' forms of 'sociable governance' (Williamson 2014a; 2014b) . Learning to code is a logical outgrowth of this proliferation of technologies of co-construction, crowdsourcing and prosumption.
However, network-based activities of programming, prosumption and so on are also interweaving individuals more and more densely into new data-based social media infrastructures. In their analysis of social media in contemporary popular culture, Beer and Burrows (2013) argue that data accumulation does not just 'capture' culture but is recombined through feedback loops to actually shape, reconstitute and coconstruct popular culture and everyday practices. They offer examples such as automated recommendations services and 'behavioural advertising' in consumption practices (techniques commonly practised by Amazon, Google, Spotify, Facebook and other social media services). These services accumulate personal and behavioural data from online transactions and run these data through predictive analytics in order to generate personalized recommendations. On the basis of users' subsequent behaviour, these systems then work recombinantly and recursively by continually harvesting users' by-product data and feeding it back into their predictive recommendations.
Through learning to code, young people are increasingly being positioned as 'prosumers' whose active production of online content-in the shape of Facebook updates, tweets, online purchases, and so on-is now the basis for the business models of most major social media companies. The job of the prosumer is to produce content from which commercial organizations can attempt to extract value. Moreover, these data can then be used to modify future services and recommendations-thus subtly and continually reshaping cultural engagement itself. In this sense, learning to code firmly embeds young people in what Kitchin and Dodge (2011: 6) term the 'coded infrastructures' that now orchestrate many of the patterns of everyday life, and that and are subject to the commercial interests of for-profit communication corporations. Consequently, learning to code is not a neutral or depoliticized material practice, but shaped, patterned, ordered and governed by powerfully commercialized coded infrastructures. In turn, through their material participation in the coded infrastructures of prosumption, young people are being shaped and moulded with particular ways of seeing, thinking, and acting; their digital subjectivities sculpted by the systems of thought programmed into the software they use. The prosumerist individual configured by the software of social media providers is encouraged to share personal information and data; maximize sociality through horizontal networks of connected friends; extend reach, influence and collaboration through liking and sharing digital artefacts; and to contribute through everyday participative and creative forms of digital making, software programming, and coding. Learning to code is a material practice that takes place in the coded infrastructures of contemporary algorithmic power.
Conclusion
This chapter has begun to unpack two emerging issues in terms of power in education. Through documenting and analyzing the recent growth of learning to code in schools, it has shown, firstly, how education is increasingly being targeted by intermediary organizations which represent particular kinds of agendas and concentrate a variety of powerful interests from across the commercial, civil society and governmental sectors. Education policy is being discussed and made in new places, by new actors, through new forms of network governance and through relationships among policy networks. The planned introduction of the new computing curriculum in England in 2014, with its strong emphasis on computer science, computational thinking and computer programming over ICT skills, demonstrates how the networking together of commercial and governmental interests, much of it accomplished through relationships brokered by intermediary organizations such as Nesta and the Nominet Trust and by their discursive production of reports and campaigns, is now exerting considerable influence on mainstream educational policymaking. As a policy discourse, not just a set of pedagogies, learning to code is evidence of shifting power relations in education policy and governance. Specifically it is evidence of the displacement of power to cross-sector intermediaries such as public and social policy innovation labs, and of their capacity to broker connections, conversations and new forms of 'sociable governance' among distributed 'policy networks' of governmental, civil society and commercial actors. Secondly, the chapter has shown how, through the work of these intermediary actors, education is increasingly being embedded in coded infrastructures which demand a reshaping of young people's capacities and abilities. Through learning to code, young people are being inculcated into the material practices and codes of conduct associated with the cultures, ways of viewing the world, and ideologies of computer programmers-particularly the assumption that technical engineering, algorithms and coding solutions can be applied for 'social good' and to 'hack' human, social and public problems. As producers and not just consumers of coded products, they are also being embedded as prosumers in the infrastructures of contemporary social media participation, making their everyday activities amenable to the extraction of value by powerful commercial social media companies and to the subtly recursive shaping of contemporary life.
The learning to code movement has been transformed from its origins among grassroots movements such as Computing at School. It has become the focus for a variety of powerful commercial, governmental and civil society actors, mediated by intermediaries and venture capital organizations that are little recognized in educational research. While some of its original enthusiasts and advocates saw learning to code as a way to give power back to users, or to stimulate informed citizenship for an increasingly digitally dense world, it has been translated into the business model of global social media and computing corporations, mobilized in political ambitions for a digital economy, and embedded as a material practice of prosumption in the coded infrastructures of a recursive digital culture. This is a culture in which, as Lash (2007) argues, power is in the algorithm-where software and its code and algorithms are constantly generating new realities, and where young people are being configured in the conduct of coders, with the skills and capacities to write the software and algorithms that will engineer, activate and 'hack' the future.
